USA v. Tyrone Gaddis, No. 23-1913 (7th Cir. 2024)
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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted May 2, 2024 Decided May 6, 2024 Before DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge No. 23-1913 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. v. No. 1:21-CR-00576(1) TYRONE GADDIS, Defendant-Appellant. Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge. ORDER Tyrone Gaddis pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924. The district judge sentenced Gaddis to a within-guidelines sentence of 96 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. Gaddis has filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel believes that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Gaddis has not responded to counsel’s motion to withdraw. See CIR. R. 51(b). Based on our review of counsel’s submission, and following our practice in similar appeals, we will suspend this appeal to determine if it presents a nonfrivolous issue. No. 23-1913 Page 2 Counsel considers whether Gaddis may reasonably challenge the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) (holding that restrictions on possessing firearms are constitutional only if there is a tradition of such regulation in U.S. history). We have been holding appeals challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g) in abeyance pending the outcomes of United States v. Rahimi, No. 22-915 (argued Nov. 7, 2023) (considering whether § 922(g)(8), which bars the possession of firearms by persons subject to domesticviolence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment) and United States v. Prince, No. 23-3155 (7th Cir.) (considering constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in light of Bruen). See, e.g., United States v. Pangborn, No. 23-3105 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 2023) (suspending appeal pending resolution of Rahimi); United States v. Mowen, No. 23-1890 (7th Cir. Feb. 23, 2024) (suspending appeal pending resolution of Prince). We acknowledge that Gaddis did not preserve this challenge in the district court, so our review would be for plain error. See Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507 (2021). And, as counsel observes, under the state of the law today, any error is not plain. Still, the outcome of Rahimi or Prince might allow Gaddis to argue that the district judge plainly erred in this case. See Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 269 (2013) (error may become “plain” under precedents released while appeal is pending). For that reason, we recently suspended the appeal sua sponte in United States v. Taylor, an Anders case also raising a potential plain-error challenge to § 922(g)(1). No. 22-3298 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2024). We also note that Gaddis does not face another, concurrent sentence that might obviate a plain-error challenge to § 922(g). Cf. United States v. LeijaSanchez, 820 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2016) (concurrent sentences can justify refusal to review possible plain error in one sentence.) Thus, consistent with our practice in these cases, we will hold this appeal in abeyance pending the outcome of Rahimi or Prince. Proceedings in this appeal are SUSPENDED pending resolution of Rahimi or Prince. Counsel shall file a statement of position within 14 days of a decision in one of these cases, whichever is decided first, stating whether counsel intends to withdraw the Anders motion or supplement the Anders brief, or whether a further stay is appropriate.
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